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_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
It is only on rare instances that a jury‟s verdict in a 
civil case should be overturned.  This appeal presents the 
question whether this is such a case.   
 
Courtland Pitts filed a Complaint against Corporal 
Gregory Spence of the Delaware State Police, asserting 
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law.  After a trial, a 
jury found in favor of Pitts on two of his four claims.  The 
District Court granted Spence‟s subsequent motion for 
judgment as matter of law, made pursuant to Rule 50 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Viewing the evidence in 
the light most favorable to Pitts, we conclude that the District 
Court erred. 
 
I. 
 
Pitts‟ Complaint against Spence alleged that Spence 
falsely arrested, illegally seized, and maliciously prosecuted 
him, as well as deprived him of equal protection under the 
law.  At trial, Pitts testified that his claims arose out of events 
occurring when Pitts, who is African American, went to 
3 
 
Mitchem‟s Auto Body Shop and conversed with its owner, 
James Mitchem, Jr., who is Caucasian, about Pitts‟ 
displeasure with work Mitchem had done on Pitts‟ car.  A 
verbal dispute between the men arose, which quickly 
escalated into a physical altercation.  At some point, Mitchem 
“promised” to “[o]pen up a can of whoop ass” on Pitts, which 
Mitchem conceded was intended to convey a physical threat.  
App. at 328-29.  The men brawled and Pitts knocked 
Mitchem to the ground by punching him after Mitchem lost 
his balance.   
  
After Mitchem fell, Daniel Wykpisz, a shop employee 
who had witnessed the altercation and who is Caucasian, 
grabbed an aluminum baseball bat from the shop and chased 
Pitts from the area.  During the chase, Pitts came across a 
board, which he picked up to defend himself.  Wykpisz then 
stopped giving chase, turned around, and walked back to the 
shop. 
 
Pitts testified that he walked back to his car, which he 
had parked in the common parking lot shared by the 
numerous industrial shops in the area, and discovered that his 
car windshield and hood had sustained fresh damage.  
Mitchem later admitted responsibility for causing the damage.  
While Pitts was near his car, Mitchem threatened him by 
saying “[y]ou better get the F out of here or I‟ll get my gun.”  
App. at 252.  Pitts dialed 9-1-1 several times, conveying to 
the dispatcher that he had been chased with a baseball bat and 
that Mitchem had threatened him with a gun.  Wykpisz and 
Mitchem testified they had also called 9-1-1.  At least two 
officers responded to the calls, including Spence, who is 
Caucasian, and another officer, Corporal Helen Dane.   
 
Although the exact sequence of events is unclear, Pitts 
testified that when Pitts saw Spence‟s patrol car, he started 
waving his arms to identify himself as the person who called 
for assistance.  Spence, who had received a report that there 
might be a gun at the scene, acknowledged Pitts by rolling 
down his window slightly and yelling, “[g]et back, get back.”  
App. at 255.  Pitts accused Spence of treating him unfairly, 
exclaiming “[i]f I was a white guy, you would have been out 
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of that car, and I would have been treated differently.”  Id.  
According to Pitts, Spence then jumped out of his patrol car, 
got in Pitts‟ face, and when Pitts asked for Spence‟s badge 
number and supervisor‟s name, told Pitts to “[s]hut the fuck 
up.”  App. at 256.     
 
Pitts and Spence hollered at each other and Spence 
eventually told Pitts that “[i]f you don‟t shut the fuck up, I‟m 
going to arrest you.”  App. at 257.  Pitts put his hands behind 
his back and told Spence that he was not going to resist.  
Spence handcuffed Pitts and placed him in the backseat of the 
patrol car, but did not read Pitts his rights under Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).   
 
Pitts testified that he was unable to tell Spence about 
Mitchem‟s threats or that Wykpisz chased him with a bat 
because Spence “never gave [Pitts] a chance” and “didn‟t 
want to hear anything [Pitts] had to say.”  App. at 276.  Pitts 
declined to give a statement but Spence continued his 
investigation by speaking with Mitchem and Wykpisz, who 
gave a narrative of the events and informed Spence that Pitts 
had made the gun threat.  Pitts did not see Spence question 
any of the numerous witnesses who had gathered at the scene.   
 
After speaking with Mitchem and Wykpisz, Spence 
drove Pitts to the police station where Pitts‟ Miranda rights 
were read to him and he was informed of the charges against 
him.  Spence charged Pitts with aggravated menacing, two 
counts of terroristic threatening, assault in the third degree, 
disorderly conduct, and criminal trespass.  Spence charged 
Mitchem with disorderly conduct, offensive touching, and 
criminal mischief.  Dane also arrested Mitchem and brought 
him to the station.   
 
Spence towed and conducted an inventory search of 
Pitts‟ car.  The inventory search produced nothing 
incriminating.  Spence did not report finding a weapon.   
 
The parties‟ briefs do not discuss the state court trial 
based on the charges against Pitts on one hand and Mitchem 
on the other.  Pitts was acquitted of all the charges brought 
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against him.  Pitts asserts that Mitchem pled no contest to two 
of the charges against him, and that the third was dropped 
pursuant to a plea agreement.   
 
Following the state court proceedings, the District 
Court proceeded to hear the instant suit, which Pitts had filed 
against Spence.  The jury returned a verdict, pursuant to a 
general verdict form, finding in favor of Pitts on his illegal 
seizure and equal protection claims, and in favor of Spence on 
Pitts‟ false arrest and malicious prosecution claims.   The jury 
awarded Pitts $80,000 in compensatory damages and $1,000 
in punitive damages.  Spence filed a motion for judgment as 
matter of law, which the District Court granted.   
 
In granting the motion, the District Court noted that 
the parties‟ agreed-upon instructions presented the jury with 
two possible scenarios that could support Pitts‟ claim of 
illegal seizure: (1) when Spence handcuffed and placed Pitts 
in the back of the patrol car; and (2) when Spence towed and 
conducted an inventory search of Pitts‟ car.1  The District 
Court first considered whether there was sufficient evidence 
to support the jury‟s illegal seizure verdict insofar as it was 
based on Pitts‟ detention.  Citing investigatory detention 
jurisprudence under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the 
Court concluded that “based on the facts available to Corporal 
Spence at the time he handcuffed Mr. Pitts, the detention of 
                                              
1
   The District Court held that the jury‟s verdict in favor 
of Spence on Pitts‟ false arrest claim was facially inconsistent 
with its verdict in favor of Pitts on his illegal seizure claim 
insofar as the latter was based on Pitts‟ arrest, but that the 
verdicts may be reconcilable if Pitts‟ detention were viewed 
as separate and distinct from his arrest.  The Court, however, 
declined to address whether the verdicts could be so 
harmonized because, as it stated, “regardless of whether the 
verdict is inconsistent or reconcilable, the Court concludes 
that Corporal Spence is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law because there is insufficient evidence to support the jury 
verdict that Mr. Pitts was subject to an illegal seizure based 
upon his handcuffing and placement in the patrol vehicle.”  
Pitts v. Spence, 722 F. Supp. 2d 476, 481 (D. Del. 2010). 
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Mr. Pitts was reasonable in that Corporal Spence had an 
articulable suspicion that Mr. Pitts had been involved in a 
fight at Mitchem‟s Auto Body Shop, and that Corporal 
Spence‟s personal safety or the safety of others at the scene 
could be in danger.”  Pitts v. Spence, 722 F. Supp. 2d 476, 
483 (D. Del. 2010).  The Court therefore held that Spence‟s 
detention of Pitts was reasonable as a matter of law and that 
there was insufficient evidence to support the jury‟s verdict to 
the extent it was based on this conduct.  
 
The Court next considered whether there was 
sufficient evidence to support the jury‟s illegal seizure verdict 
insofar as it was based on the search and seizure of Pitts‟ car.  
The Court concluded that Spence‟s testimony at trial 
established “that the towing of [Pitts‟] vehicle was required 
both to prevent harm to the vehicle and to prevent the 
possibility of another altercation.”  Id. at 484.  Based on this 
testimony, and Spence‟s assertion that he conducted the 
search in accordance with standard procedure, the Court held 
that the search and seizure was reasonable as a matter of law 
and that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury‟s 
verdict in Pitts‟ favor.  The Court rejected Pitts‟ argument that 
the evidence suggested that the search of the car was 
pretextual.  It also rejected Pitts‟ contention that Spence‟s 
admission that he lacked probable cause to search Pitts‟ car 
rendered the inventory search unreasonable.  In finding this 
argument unpersuasive, the Court cited inventory search 
jurisprudence and reasoned that “the concept of probable 
cause is not implicated in an inventory search.”  Id. 
 
Turning to the jury‟s verdict in favor of Pitts on his 
equal protection claim, the Court was not persuaded that 
Spence‟s failure to properly document or investigate the 
incident could support the jury‟s verdict, reasoning that “any 
gaps in the police report concerning Mr. Pitts‟ point of view 
are attributable to [Pitts‟] own lack of cooperation” in 
declining to give a statement to Spence after Spence 
attempted to interview him.  Id. at 487.  The Court rejected 
Pitts‟ other arguments, concluding that there was “no 
evidence” that Spence acted with discriminatory purpose or 
that his actions were in any way motivated by racial animus.  
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Id. at 486.  The Court therefore granted Spence judgment as a 
matter of law on Pitts‟ equal protection claim. 
 
Having overturned both of the jury‟s verdicts in favor 
of Pitts, the Court denied the motions of Pitts‟ current and 
former counsel made pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for 
attorneys‟ fees and expenses, on the basis that Pitts was no 
longer a prevailing party.  Pitts appeals. 
 
II. 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1331 and this court has appellate jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review 
over the District Court‟s decision to grant judgment as a 
matter of law, viewing the record evidence in the light most 
favorable to Pitts, as the verdict winner, and drawing all 
reasonable inferences in his favor.  We have cautioned that a 
court should grant judgment as a matter of law “sparingly.”  
Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 204 (3d Cir. 2003).  A 
court must not weigh evidence, engage in credibility 
determinations, or substitute its version of the facts for the 
jury‟s.  Only if the record is “critically deficient of the 
minimum quantum of evidence” upon which a jury could 
reasonably base its verdict will we affirm a court‟s grant of 
judgment as a matter of law.  Acumed LLC v. Advanced 
Surgical Servs., Inc., 561 F.3d 199, 211 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(internal quotation omitted).   
 
III. 
 
Pitts contends that the District Court erred in 
concluding that the evidence was insufficient to support the 
jury‟s illegal seizure verdict in his favor.  Pursuant to the 
parties‟ agreement, the Court instructed the jury that the 
Fourth Amendment “protects persons from being subjected to 
unreasonable searches and seizures by police.”  App. at 520.  
The Court explained that Pitts was required to demonstrate by 
a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that Spence 
“intentionally handcuffed [Mr. Pitts], and placed him in the 
back seat of a patrol vehicle, and towed and impounded [his] 
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vehicle[;]” (2) “that those acts subjected Mr. Pitts to a 
seizure[;]” and (3) that “the seizure was unreasonable.”  App. 
at 520-21.  With respect to reasonableness, the jury heard 
only that an arrest of a person constitutes an unreasonable 
seizure if not supported by probable cause.  The jury was told 
to consider in its probable cause assessment “whether the 
facts and circumstances available to Corporal Spence would 
warrant a prudent police officer in believing that Mr. Pitts had 
committed or was committing a crime.”  App. at 521. 
 
We agree with Pitts that the evidence was sufficient to 
permit the jury to conclude that Spence subjected Pitts to an 
unlawful seizure.
2
  With regard to Pitts‟ detention, Spence 
testified that at the time that he detained Pitts, he had not 
finished his investigation and had not decided whether Pitts 
“should be arrested for anything at that point.”  App. at 461.  
Additionally, Spence and Pitts both testified that Spence had 
not read Pitts his Miranda rights at that time.  Spence testified 
only that he detained Pitts because Spence feared for his 
safety, an assertion the jury could have found not credible 
because Spence failed to include any mention of that fear in 
his contemporaneous crime report.  It follows that the District 
Court necessarily weighed the evidence and did not view it in 
the light most favorable to Pitts when it concluded that Pitts‟ 
                                              
2
  With respect to the District Court‟s holding that the 
jury‟s verdict on the illegal seizure and false arrest claims 
were facially inconsistent, we conclude that the verdicts, to 
the extent they were inconsistent, were reconcilable.  A court 
has a “„duty to attempt to read the verdict in a manner that 
will resolve inconsistencies.‟”  Mosley v. Wilson, 102 F.3d 
85, 90 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting City of L.A. v. Heller, 475 U.S. 
796, 806 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).  Here, the verdicts 
were reconcilable on the basis that the instructions permitted 
the jury to conclude that Pitts‟ detention was an unlawful 
seizure, and there was sufficient evidence to support that 
determination.  Moreover, the instructions permitted the jury 
to conclude that the search and seizure of Pitts‟ car was an 
unlawful seizure, and there was also sufficient evidence to 
support that determination. 
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detention was reasonable as a matter of law in light of 
Spence‟s asserted fear.   
 
Moreover, it was error for the Court to rely on Fourth 
Amendment principles regarding investigatory detentions 
because the jury was not instructed on that jurisprudence.  
Even if Spence had an articulable suspicion that Pitts had 
committed a crime, the jury was informed only of the law 
regarding probable cause.  The jury could have concluded on 
the evidence that probable cause was lacking; and thus, based 
on the instructions given, the evidence was sufficient to 
support Pitts‟ claim that Pitts‟ detention was unlawful. 
 
With regard to the towing and inventory search of 
Pitts‟ car, Spence conceded at trial that he lacked probable 
cause to conduct a search of Pitts‟ car.  Spence testified that 
he considered the towing necessary to prevent the possibility 
of another altercation or further damage to Pitts‟ car, and 
conceded that he did not search the car for safety reasons or 
to look for a gun.  The jury, however, could have found that 
Spence was not credible and could have concluded that 
Spence unlawfully searched the car in order to search for the 
gun that Mitchem had accused Pitts of threatening to use.  
The Court necessarily weighed the evidence and did not view 
it in the light most favorable to Pitts when it concluded that 
there was no evidence to support a suggestion of pretext and 
that Spence‟s asserted fear rendered the towing and inventory 
search reasonable as a matter of law.  It was also error for the 
Court to consider inventory-search jurisprudence in its 
analysis because the jury was not given an instruction 
thereon.  Based on the instructions given, the evidence was 
sufficient to support the jury‟s verdict, and the District Court 
erred in concluding otherwise.  
 
Pitts further asserts that the District Court erred in 
concluding that the evidence was insufficient to support the 
jury‟s verdict in Pitts‟ favor on his equal protection claim.  
The Court informed the jury that “[t]he Equal Protection 
Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States 
Constitution . . . guarantees each and every person that they 
will not be denied their fundamental rights in an arbitrary or 
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discriminatory manner.”  App. at 518.  The Court explained 
that it was Pitts‟ burden to demonstrate by a preponderance of 
the evidence that Spence was motivated by a discriminatory 
purpose, or “an intent or purpose to discriminate against 
[Pitts] . . . based upon [Pitts]‟ membership in a protected 
class.”  App. at 519.  It was also Pitts‟ burden to demonstrate 
that Spence‟s conduct had a discriminatory effect, which “is 
shown where the plaintiff is a member of a protected class, he 
is similarly situated to members of that class, and that he was 
treated differently than members of the unprotected class.”  
App. at 519-20.  The jury was informed that it could consider 
direct or circumstantial evidence in its deliberations and that 
neither form of evidence was superior to the other.   
 
We agree with Pitts that the evidence circumstantially 
demonstrated that Spence violated Pitts‟ rights to equal 
protection.  For example, the jury was entitled to consider 
Spence‟s admittedly inaccurate reporting of the incident.  
Spence acknowledged that he did not record that he spoke 
with Pitts first upon arriving at the scene, that Pitts accused 
Spence of being racist, that Spence handcuffed Pitts and 
placed him in his patrol car before interviewing Mitchem and 
Wykpisz, or that Spence did not try to interview Pitts after he 
concluded his investigation.  Spence explained that he “didn‟t 
feel the need” to explain and that “there was no reason to say” 
that Pitts had accused Spence of being racist because that 
exchange was “irrelevant to the crimes that occurred between 
[Pitts] and Mr. Mitchem.”  App. at 405-06.  The jury, 
however, was entitled to disregard this testimony as 
incredible.  The District Court‟s conclusion that Spence‟s 
inaccurate reporting was the fault of Pitts‟ decision to remain 
silent, a right that he was entitled to exercise under the Fifth 
Amendment, was not only in direct conflict with Spence‟s 
testimony, but also necessarily resulted from the Court‟s 
substitution of its view of the facts for the jury‟s.  
 
The jury was also entitled to consider Spence‟s 
testimony regarding his manner of investigating the incident.  
Spence admitted that he did not question Mitchem‟s 
statement that Pitts told Mitchem that he was going to get a 
gun.  Indeed, Spence‟s crime report made no mention of 
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Spence having interviewed anyone other than Wykpisz or 
Mitchem at the scene.
3
  And Spence admitted that he did not 
give Pitts an opportunity at the scene to rebut Mitchem‟s 
allegation.  Spence agreed that because Mitchem reported that 
Pitts was the one who had threatened to retrieve a gun, “[t]hat 
was good enough for [him] to end that part of the 
investigation.”  App. at 398.  The jury could have deemed this 
testimony suggestive that Spence was motivated by 
discriminatory purpose and that his conduct had a 
discriminatory effect. 
 
Similarly suggesting an equal protection violation was 
the testimony of Pauline Reid, a witness to the altercation and 
Pitts‟ confrontation with Spence.  Reid testified that Spence 
was “agitated” and “elevated” when speaking with Pitts, and 
“was not listening to what [Pitts] was trying to explain.”  
App. at 304, 305, 309.  Reid confirmed that she was so 
concerned for Pitts‟ wellbeing after watching Spence‟s 
demeanor towards him that she followed Pitts in Spence‟s 
patrol car back to the police station.  She stated that she felt 
Pitts had been treated unfairly because the officers “bypassed 
[Pitts] and went to the other person.  They didn‟t really listen 
to [Pitts].  When they came back, no one was listening . . . .”  
App. at 309.  This observation of unequal treatment supported 
Pitts‟ assertion that Spence treated him dismissively.  The 
testimony circumstantially demonstrated that Spence acted 
with a discriminatory purpose and effect. 
 
The jury could have also given weight to Spence‟s 
post-investigation conduct.   Spence charged Pitts with 
aggravated menacing, a charge that requires that the 
defendant place the victim in fear of imminent physical 
                                              
3
  Spence testified that he attempted to interview the 
witnesses at the scene, but that they informed him that they 
did not see anything, and then dispersed.  The jury was 
entitled to discredit this testimony on the basis of Spence‟s 
failure to include any mention of his interview attempts in his 
crime report, as well as the testimony of Wykpisz, who 
agreed that “there were several people watching the fight as it 
happened.”  App. at 373. 
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injury, 11 Del. C. § 602(a), for having “CHASED VICTIM 
WYKPISZ WITH A LONG WOODEN POLE.”  App. at 67.  
At trial, however, Wykpisz testified that he was not afraid 
that Pitts would strike him, and in fact turned his back to Pitts 
to walk back to the shop.  The jury could have concluded that 
Spence was aware that Wykpisz did not feel threatened, and 
acted with discriminatory purpose and effect by bringing an 
improper charge against Pitts.
4
  Moreover, Spence 
acknowledged that he simultaneously sent the warrants for 
Mitchem and Pitts to the arraigning judge, but his warrant for 
Pitts was detailed, and his warrant for Mitchem was not.  The 
warrant for Pitts emphasized in capital letters the alleged 
conduct supporting the basis of each charge.  The warrant for 
Mitchem, on the other hand, capitalized names and locations.  
It also failed to include any description of Mitchem‟s alleged 
conduct that supported the charges against him.  These 
unaccounted for differences provided support for the jury‟s 
verdict in favor of Pitts.   
 
The above sampling of evidence, much of which the 
District Court failed to mention, was sufficient to support the 
jury‟s verdict in favor of Pitts on his equal protection claim.  
In concluding that there was no evidence that Spence was 
motivated by a discriminatory purpose and engaged in 
conduct that had a discriminatory effect, the Court necessarily 
weighed the evidence, engaged in credibility determinations, 
and substituted its view of the facts for the jury‟s.  This 
exceeded the Court‟s role and was therefore in error.5    
                                              
4
  This conclusion would not have been impermissibly 
inconsistent with the jury‟s verdict in favor of Spence on 
Pitts‟ malicious prosecution claim.  Neither the instructions 
nor the general verdict form required the jury to conclude that 
every charge Spence brought against Pitts was supported by 
probable cause.  Thus, the jury could have concluded that any 
one of the six charges brought against Pitts was supported by 
probable cause to find in favor of Spence on Pitts‟ malicious 
prosecution claim. 
 
5
  Because we conclude that the District Court erred in 
granting Spence‟s motion for judgment as a matter of law, we 
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IV. 
 
 This case does not present one of those infrequent 
occasions in which the record evidence is so critically 
deficient that the jury‟s verdict should be overturned.  To the 
contrary, when viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to Pitts, as we must, we conclude that the evidence 
amply supported Pitts‟ claims.  Accordingly, we will reverse 
the judgment of the District Court and reinstate the jury‟s 
verdict and damages award in Pitts‟ favor.  We will also 
vacate the District Court‟s denial of the motions of Pitts‟ 
current and former counsel for attorneys‟ fees and expenses 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, with instructions that the District 
Court consider those motions on the merits. 
                                                                                                     
need not address Pitts‟ remaining contention that the District 
Court abused its discretion in partially denying his motion to 
compel the production of documents.   
 
